The Sultanate of Oman possesses a rich cultural and creative heritage that spans traditional crafts and heritage, media, the arts, and emerging digital creative industries such as gaming. Yet this wealth of cultural assets has not yet evolved into an integrated economic sector capable of making a sustained contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), generating employment, and attracting investment, as has been achieved in several international contexts.
This situation is often attributed to limited funding or insufficient investment. However, the roots of the challenge extend far beyond financial constraints. The issue is not a lack of talent or creative potential, but rather the absence of a governance framework capable of coordinating institutional efforts and connecting culture with the economy, media, tourism, education, and innovation within a shared national vision.
In Oman, responsibility for cultural and creative industries formally lies with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth. However, the inherently cross-sectoral nature of these industries means that responsibility for their development is, in practice, dispersed across multiple government entities. Media falls under a separate institutional framework, cultural tourism intersects with the Ministry of Heritage and Tourism, traditional crafts are linked to the entrepreneurial ecosystem led by the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority, while digital creative industries overlap with digital economy and digital transformation policies led by the Ministry of Transport, Communications and Information Technology.
This does not suggest a failure on the part of any individual institution. Rather, it reflects the complex nature of the sector itself. Cultural and creative industries inherently transcend the institutional boundaries of a single ministry. In the absence of a clear coordination mechanism, policies become fragmented, initiatives are duplicated, data are dispersed across multiple agencies, and it becomes difficult to develop a comprehensive understanding of the creative economy’s actual size and its contribution to national development.
Before considering what an appropriate governance structure might look like, however, a more fundamental question must first be addressed one that is often overlooked not only in policy debates but also within the academic literature:
Do Cultural and Creative Industries Need Governance at All?
At first glance, this question may appear self-evident. Yet the scholarly literature offers no single answer. Indeed, it represents one of the most enduring debates within cultural and creative industries research, dividing those who regard governance as essential for addressing market failures from those who argue that excessive regulation risks constraining creativity and limiting innovation.
Scepticism towards governance is informed by several creative industries that emerged outside conventional institutional frameworks, most notably Nollywood in Nigeria. The Nigerian film industry has become one of the world’s largest film industries, contributing more than 2% of national GDP and creating employment for hundreds of thousands of people despite emerging within the informal economy, largely independent of government planning or formal regulatory structures. In this context, Lobato (2010) argues that Nollywood demonstrates the capacity of informal markets to build large-scale, economically sustainable media industries without direct institutional intervention.
This critique extends well beyond the Nigerian experience to a broader theoretical debate concerning the relationship between culture and public policy. In The Cultural Industries, David Hesmondhalgh argues that the United Kingdom’s shift towards the concept of the “creative industries” during the late 1990s fundamentally changed the way governments justified cultural policy. Rather than being valued solely for its artistic or social significance, culture increasingly came to be justified through its contribution to economic growth and job creation a process he describes as the instrumentalisation of culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2019). Hesmondhalgh warns that such a shift may encourage policymakers to prioritise activities capable of generating immediate economic returns at the expense of more experimental or less easily measurable forms of cultural expression.
Similarly, Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) argue that certain governance models may unintentionally reinforce established cultural institutions while marginalising emerging and independent initiatives that lack proven economic performance or measurable indicators of success. In this sense, governance may evolve from a mechanism intended to support the sector into one that reproduces existing institutional hierarchies and limits opportunities for new entrants.
Building on this body of scholarship, this article describes this challenge as the “early regulation trap.” This refers to situations in which governments become preoccupied with establishing official classifications, eligibility criteria, and regulatory frameworks before the market itself has reached sufficient maturity. Such premature institutionalisation may constrain experimentation and exclude emerging creative initiatives that, although still developing, may ultimately become the sector’s most culturally and economically significant contributors.
Terry Flew similarly cautions against transplanting governance models developed in Western contexts into countries whose creative and institutional ecosystems remain at different stages of development. Doing so, he argues, may produce unintended consequences, restricting rather than enabling sectoral growth (Flew, 2012).
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the debate is not about whether governance should exist, but rather about its form, timing, and scope. This raises a more important question:
So… Why Governance Despite All This?
The real question is not whether cultural and creative industries require governance, but rather what kind of governance they require.
The economic literature has consistently shown that cultural and creative industries are characterised by structural market failures. Their reliance on intangible assets such as intellectual property, reputation, and human capital makes access to finance considerably more difficult than in conventional industries. In addition, creative markets exhibit what economists describe as winner-take-all dynamics. Sherwin Rosen first explained this phenomenon through his theory of The Economics of Superstars, later expanded by Frank and Cook in The Winner-Take-All Society. Their work demonstrates how a relatively small number of creators or products capture a disproportionate share of market returns, while most new entrants struggle to survive (Rosen, 1981; Frank & Cook, 1995).
These structural characteristics are further compounded by weak intellectual property protection, which reduces incentives for investment, and by the absence of reliable statistical data, which leaves the sector largely invisible to investors and policymakers regardless of its actual economic contribution.
Ironically, Nollywood itself the industry frequently cited as evidence that creative markets can flourish without formal governance now faces significant structural challenges, including widespread piracy, limited institutional finance, and weak copyright enforcement. International estimates suggest that piracy continues to account for a substantial proportion of audiovisual content circulation in Nigeria, undermining returns for both creators and investors and threatening the industry’s long-term sustainability. Nollywood’s early success therefore did not eliminate the later need for stronger institutions capable of regulating markets, protecting intellectual property, and supporting investment.
The debate, therefore, should not be framed as a choice between governance and no governance, but rather between two fundamentally different approaches to governance.
The first is enabling governance. Its purpose is to remove regulatory barriers, coordinate institutional responsibilities, improve statistical systems, strengthen intellectual property protection, expand market opportunities, and create conditions in which entrepreneurs, creators, and private investment can flourish.
The second is controlling governance. Rather than enabling growth, it prioritises bureaucratic oversight, introduces unnecessary regulatory constraints, discourages diversity, and reduces creativity to narrow administrative performance indicators. Instead of supporting the sector, it risks constraining its development.
This distinction closely aligns with Terry Flew’s argument that governance models should never be transferred mechanically from one country to another without considering differences in institutional capacity, cultural context, and the stage of creative sector development (Flew, 2012). Effective governance is therefore not about replicating a particular institutional model, but about designing one that responds to local realities, is informed by reliable evidence, and gives creators and the private sector a meaningful role in shaping policy rather than merely complying with it.
This distinction should guide future discussions on the governance of cultural and creative industries in Oman. The central question is not which ministry should assume responsibility, but how a governance system can be designed to coordinate institutions, support sectoral growth, and preserve the diversity and flexibility that are essential to creativity.
For this reason, international experience does not offer a single institutional blueprint to be copied. Rather, it provides a range of governance principles that can inform the development of a model suited to Oman’s institutional context and national development priorities.
What Can We Learn from International Experience?
International experience does not point to a single model for governing cultural and creative industries. Rather, it demonstrates that countries have adopted diverse institutional arrangements while converging around one fundamental principle: creative industries cannot be governed effectively within the boundaries of a single ministry. Instead, they require coordinated governance that connects culture with the economy, media, tourism, education, and innovation.
The United Kingdom: When Creativity Becomes Economic Policy
The United Kingdom was the first country to embed the concept of the creative industries within a comprehensive government policy framework. Through the establishment of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)and the publication of the world’s first Creative Industries Mapping Document in 1998, the UK formally recognised creativity as an economic sector rather than solely a cultural one.
Perhaps more importantly, it restructured the institutional relationship between culture, media, and tourism, creating an integrated policy framework that enabled government to measure the sector’s economic contribution and develop evidence-based policy.
South Korea: When the Agency Matters More than the Ministry
South Korea adopted a different institutional model. While the Ministry of Culture retained responsibility for strategic policymaking, the government established the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) as a specialised executive agency responsible for industry development, data collection, monitoring emerging sectors, and linking creative industries to the national statistical system.
The Korean experience demonstrates the value of specialised institutions capable of responding flexibly to rapidly evolving creative markets. Rather than waiting for official sector recognition, KOCCA has often begun measuring emerging industries before they are formally incorporated into national statistics, allowing policymakers to anticipate future growth rather than merely react to it.
Singapore: A Whole-of-Government Approach
Singapore manages its creative economy through a whole-of-government approach, in which responsibility is shared across several ministries and agencies rather than concentrated within a single institution. The Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Economic Development Board, and the Infocomm Media Development Authority all contribute to a common national strategy.
This model illustrates that successful governance does not depend on institutional consolidation. Instead, it relies upon clearly defined responsibilities, effective inter-agency coordination, and a shared strategic vision.
Ireland: When Institutional Change Reflects Institutional Maturity
Ireland provides a useful example of governance as an adaptive process rather than a fixed institutional arrangement. The government initially combined culture, tourism, media, and sport within a single ministry before later separating tourism into a different portfolio.
Rather than signalling policy failure, this restructuring demonstrates that governance arrangements should evolve as sectors mature and institutional priorities change. Effective governance is therefore characterised by adaptability rather than permanence.
Saudi Arabia: Building an Integrated Cultural Governance System
Saudi Arabia has undertaken one of the Gulf region’s most ambitious institutional reforms in the cultural sector. Through the establishment of eleven specialised cultural commissions under the Ministry of Culture and their alignment with Saudi Vision 2030, the Kingdom has created a governance framework that combines sector-specific leadership with broader national development objectives.
At the same time, initiatives such as the State of Culture Report 2024 reflect growing recognition of the need to measure the economic contribution of culture through national indicators, signalling a broader transition from governing culture as a public service to governing it as an economic sector.
What Does This Mean for Oman?
Despite their institutional differences, these international experiences point to several common lessons for Oman.
First, integration matters more than institutional separation. Cultural and creative industries intersect naturally with media, tourism, education, technology, and entrepreneurship. Treating these sectors as isolated policy domains inevitably limits their collective economic potential.
Second, coordination is more important than organisational restructuring. Successful governance depends less on the number or structure of institutions than on their ability to coordinate policy, align responsibilities, monitor implementation, and evaluate outcomes.
Third, enabling governance should take precedence over controlling governance. The purpose of governance is not to create additional layers of bureaucracy but to remove barriers to creativity and investment, improve the regulatory environment, and enable creators and businesses to grow. Governance that prioritises regulation over innovation risks undermining the very sector it seeks to support.
Conclusion
Public debate often revolves around a single question:
Which ministry should be responsible for cultural and creative industries?
International experience suggests that this is the wrong question.
The real issue is not the name of the ministry, the number of institutions involved, or where responsibility sits within government. Rather, it is whether a governance system exists that provides a shared strategic vision, coordinates institutions, integrates policy, measures outcomes, and ensures accountability.
Cultural and creative industries do not thrive because they are administered by a particular ministry. They thrive because they operate within an institutional environment that connects culture, media, tourism, education, innovation, and economic policy into a coherent development agenda.
For Oman, therefore, the more important question is not:
Who should govern the cultural and creative industries?
Instead, it is: How can Oman design a governance system that unlocks the sector’s potential, enables it to contribute to economic diversification, and preserves the flexibility, diversity, and creativity upon which its future depends?
The answer to this question will shape not only the future of Oman’s cultural and creative industries, but also the country’s broader ambition to build a more diversified, innovative, and sustainable economy.